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Labor Market Information Acquisition 
and Downsizing
Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean-Jacques Laffont*
Abstract
We study the optimal mechanism for downsizing the public sector which takes into account different infor-
mational constraints (complete versus asymmetric information on each worker’s efficiency) and political
constraints (mandatory versus voluntary downsizing). Under complete information, the optimal structure
of downsizing (who is laid-off and who is not) does not depend on the political constraint and is determined
by the (marginal) cost of retaining a worker in the public sector. Since this cost includes his opportunity 
cost in the private sector, information acquisition on opportunity costs affects the structure of downsizing.
Under asymmetric information, the political constraints determine which workers obtain information 
rents and therefore affect the structure of downsizing. An increase in the precision of the information on
workers’ opportunity costs may increase or decrease social welfare depending on its impacts on the infor-
mation rents.
1. Introduction
Public sector downsizing is an increasingly important element in economic reforms of
developing countries and transition economies.1 Countries which followed state-led
development strategies often exhibit bloated bureaucracy with overstaffed public
enterprises. Severe labor redundancies in the public sector are common in transition
economies, where the shift to a market economy requires a great number of workers
to be relocated out of the public sector. In some other countries, the need for public
sector downsizing comes from a fiscal crisis which requires a severe cutback in 
government expenditures.
While the gains from downsizing are potentially large, the chances of mishandling
it are considerable as well. According to some recent cross-country studies of down-
sizing programs, adverse selection plagues downsizing programs so that many 
programs exhibit the “revolving door” syndrome, whereby separated workers are 
subsequently rehired,2 and downsizing programs carried by governments before 
privatization tend to reduce instead of increasing privatization prices (Chong and
López-de-Silanes, 2002). They also argue that a naive mechanism using severance pay
to induce voluntary separation is likely to fail in this respect since, when more able
workers have better job opportunities in the private sector, such a mechanism induces
good workers to leave and hence creates the subsequent need to rehire them.
The previous findings suggest that to be successful, a downsizing mechanism 
must carefully deal with adverse selection problems. For this purpose, we adopt a 
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mechanism design approach and study the optimal mechanism for public sector down-
sizing which accounts for different informational and political constraints. Concerning
informational constraints, we distinguish two kinds of information: one is about each
worker’s productive efficiency in the public sector and the other is about each worker’s
outside opportunity (i.e., the utility that he is expected to obtain in the private sector).
Both kinds of information are necessary to determine the desirable size of downsiz-
ing and to successfully implement it.
Even if the government designs a mechanism properly accounting for the relevant
informational constraint, the mechanism cannot be implemented if it is politically
unfeasible.3 In this respect, we can distinguish two main forms of downsizing: manda-
tory and voluntary downsizing.4 Under mandatory downsizing, the government has the
right to lay off any worker in the public sector and hence the political constraint is
minimal. In contrast, under voluntary downsizing, any worker has the right to stay in
the public sector with his current status and cannot be laid off against his will, and
therefore the political constraint is maximal. In this paper, we consider these two
extreme modes of downsizing although our analysis can be extended to an intermedi-
ate political constraint in which the government needs the approval of a majority of
workers.
In our analysis, we focus on how information acquisition in the labor market affects
the optimal mechanism and social welfare. Actually, there exists a growing empirical
literature estimating the losses that displaced workers experience after downsizing.5
Despite an increasing number of such empirical studies, there has been, to the best of
our knowledge, no attempt to formally incorporate the acquisition of labor market
information into the design of downsizing mechanisms. In our model, we consider two
sorts of information acquisition about workers’ outside opportunities. First, the govern-
ment can acquire information about how the outcome of a worker’s private sector
experience is correlated with his efficiency in the public sector. It can obtain this infor-
mation from regressions explaining displaced workers’ achievements in the private
sector.6 Second, the government can acquire information at the individual level about
the factors which affect the likely outcome of private sector experience. For instance,
consider the case in which a displaced worker pursues an investment project. Then,
with tests that evaluate his skill or aptitude necessary for running the project, the 
government can update his belief about the success of the project. In our analysis,
we assume that the first type of information has already been acquired and that the
government can receive either a good or bad signal about the outcome of each
worker’s private sector experience. We study how an increase in the precision of the
signal affects the optimal structure of downsizing and social welfare depending on the 
informational constraint (whether or not there is adverse selection) and the political
constraint (whether downsizing is mandatory or voluntary).
We consider a two-type model in which a worker’s type, i.e., his productive efficiency
in the public sector, can be efficient or inefficient. Define the full marginal cost of
retaining a worker in the public sector as the sum of his production cost in the public
sector and his expected opportunity cost in the private sector. Then, it is optimal to
start laying off the workers with the highest full cost. Whether or not an inefficient
worker has a higher full cost than an efficient worker depends on the degree of (posi-
tive) correlation between his efficiency in the public sector and the outcome of his job
search. For instance, if the human capital of the workers in the public sector is firm-
specific and the private sector is poorly developed, the degree of correlation will be
low. Then, an inefficient worker will have a higher full cost than an efficient worker.
We focus below on this case.
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When there is complete information about each worker’s type, the optimal structure
of downsizing is independent of the nature of the political constraint and has two
regimes depending on the precision of the signal: for low (high) precision, the optimal
order of downsizing is determined first by the type (the signal) and then by the signal
(the type). For instance, for low precision, it is optimal to let go the inefficient workers
having the bad signal (i.e., low opportunity cost) before the efficient workers having
the good signal (i.e., high opportunity cost). However, as the precision increases, the
opportunity cost of workers having the good signal (the bad signal) increases
(decreases) so that for high precision, it may be optimal to let go the latter before the
former.
The impact of asymmetric information about each worker’s type on the optimal
structure of downsizing differs depending on the political constraint in place. Under
mandatory downsizing, as long as the probability of retaining inefficient workers is 
positive, an efficient worker can have an information rent by pretending to be ineffi-
cient since an inefficient one has a higher production cost. This makes retaining an
additional inefficient worker more costly under asymmetric information than under 
complete information since it increases the information rent of efficient workers.
Under voluntary downsizing, if a worker refuses the downsizing offer, he remains in
the public sector and enjoys the status quo utility level. Therefore, to induce an effi-
cient worker to quit, the government has to compensate him for the loss of the utility
under the status quo. This, in turn, makes an inefficient worker obtain an information
rent by pretending to be efficient as long as the probability of laying off efficient
workers is positive.Therefore, laying off an efficient worker becomes more costly under
asymmetric information than under complete information since it increases the infor-
mation rent of inefficient workers.
The impact of an increase in the precision of the signal on social welfare is always
positive if there is complete information on workers’ types or if the probability of
receiving the signal is independent of the type. In other words, Blackwell’s theorem
can be applied to these cases. However, if there is asymmetric information about
workers’ types and the efficient type has a higher probability of receiving the good
signal than the inefficient type, Blackwell’s theorem cannot be applied and an increase
in the precision of the signal can even reduce social welfare. Since an efficient worker
has a lower production cost but a higher opportunity cost, an increase in the precision
increases the difference between an efficient worker’s full cost and that of an ineffi-
cient worker having the same signal. Therefore, the government has to give up more
information rents and this may decrease social welfare.
Our work is closely related to studies on downsizing under adverse selection. In this
literature, we can distinguish three kinds of papers according to whether adverse selec-
tion is assumed about worker’s productivity inside a firm or outside the firm or about
both. First, Diwan (1994), Levy and McLean (1996), Rama (1997), and Jeon and
Laffont (1999) study downsizing when adverse selection is about workers’ produc-
tivity inside a public sector. While the first three papers study specific mechanisms
(such as randomization, severance pay, etc.), the last paper analyzes the optimal mech-
anism under voluntary downsizing and its implementation through wage and sever-
ance pay. Second, Kahn (1985) analyzes optimal severance pay when there is
asymmetric information about workers’ outside opportunities and complete informa-
tion about their on-the-job productivities. Last, Estache, Laffont, and Zhang (2004)
study the optimal downsizing mechanism when each worker has private information
about both his productivity in the public sector and his productivity in the private
sector.7 In relation to the mechanism design literature, our paper belongs to the 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND DOWNSIZING 349
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
literature on type-dependent reservation utility (Jullien, 2000; Laffont and Tirole, 1990;
Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1995). However, none of the
previously mentioned papers studies how information acquisition about agents’ reser-
vation utilities (or workers’ outside opportunities) affects the optimal mechanism.
Our paper is also related to the literature on reforms under political constraints in
transition economies. For instance, Dewatripont and Roland (1992a, b, 1995) study 
in dynamic contexts the relative merits of gradualism versus big-bang strategy when
there is either adverse selection or aggregate uncertainty. Since we do not consider
aggregate uncertainty, our work is close to the first two papers. However, they assume
that workers have the same outside option regardless of the type and therefore do not
study the interaction between efficiency in the public sector and opportunity cost in
the private sector, which is the focus of our paper. Although we take a static partial-
equilibrium approach, our analysis generates useful insights about sequencing or speed
of reforms in transition economies (see Section 6).8
2. Model
Public Sector
The economy is composed of the public sector and the private one. We consider down-
sizing of the public sector in which risk-neutral workers of mass 1 are employed before
downsizing: the set of the workers is denoted by I. To focus on heterogeneity in terms
of productive efficiency, we assume that the workers are homogeneous in all other
aspects. Worker i’s type, with i in I, is denoted by qi. qi represents worker i’s marginal
production cost in the public sector.9 The qis are independently and identically dis-
tributed and take the value ( ) with probability n( ) = n (n( ) = 1 − n). Let ∆q ≡
− > 0. We call type the efficient type and type the inefficient type. In terms of
the informational constraint, we distinguish the case in which the government (or the
managers of the public sector) knows the qis from the case in which qi is worker i’s
private information.
We represent the inefficiency of the public sector by assuming that all workers are
asked to produce the same quantity normalized to one. This assumption holds both
before and after downsizing since we do not envision any reform of incentive schemes
in the public sector.10 Also, in the absence of any downsizing program, the salaries in the
public sector are assumed to be large enough so that each worker i derives a utility level
from the public sector before downsizing Up(qi)11 larger than his outside opportunity.
The government maximizes social welfare, denoted by W, defined as follows:
S(⋅) represents the social surplus generated by public production. S(⋅) is increasing 
and strictly concave with S¢(0) = ∞. q represents the total quantity produced by the
public sector and is equal to the mass of workers retained in the public sector. l
represents the shadow cost of public funds.12 ti is the monetary transfer from the 
government to worker i.Ui represents worker i’s utility.a represents the degree to which
the government internalizes the utilities of the workers in the public sector.13 Since 
a < 1 + l, transfers to workers are socially costly and the government will try to extract
the workers’ rents (conditionally to the inefficiency of the public sector described
above).Therefore, before downsizing, under asymmetric information about qis, the effi-
cient type obtains an information rent equal to ∆q (i.e., Up( ) − Up( ) = ∆q)14 whileqq
W S q t Ui
i I
i
i I
≡ ( ) − +( ) > ≤ ≤
∈ ∈
∑ ∑1 0 0 1l a l a+ with and .
qqqq
qqqq
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under complete information about qis, no information rent is given (i.e., Up( ) = Up
( )).We assume that S¢(1) is low enough so that it is optimal to lay off some workers.
Private Sector
A worker with type q in { , } has an expected utility Um(q) when he enters the private
sector.15 More precisely, the outcome of his private sector experience can be either a
success or a failure. In the case of success, he obtains utility UH while in the case of
failure, he obtains utility UL(<UH). For example, a displaced worker pursues an invest-
ment project and the project can either succeed or fail. Alternatively, UH (UL) may 
represent finding a good job (a bad job). A worker’s job search outcome can depend
on his efficiency in the public sector: a worker with type q will succeed with probability
m(q). Therefore, we have:16
We assume that it is common knowledge that the efficient type is more likely to
succeed in the private sector than the inefficient type (m( ) ≥ m( )). Let m ≡ nm( ) +
(1 − n)m( ). For simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
In what follows, we make two assumptions.
Assumption 1. ∆q < UH − UL.
Assumption 1 holds in general since wages are more responsive to workers’ pro-
ductivities in the private sector than in the public sector. Indeed, firms in the private
sector can use more powerful incentive schemes and compete to attract workers. The
assumption holds easily under the interpretation that UL represents finding no job (in
particular in Less Developed Countries with poor social safety nets).
Assumption 2. ∆m < ∆q/(UH − UL).
Assumption 2 holds when public sector workers’ human capital is firm-specific
rather than general (∆m small). Assumption 2 also holds in transition economies with
poorly developed private sector: then most of laid-off state-firm employees will not be
absorbed by the private sector and will remain unemployed (m and very small so ∆m
small). However, if the human capital is general enough or the private sector is well
developed, Assumption 2 may not hold: we discuss this case in Section 5.
Information Acquisition
We formalize information acquisition on the labor market as follows. The government,
after incurring some cost, receives a signal si about worker i’s probability of being suc-
cessful in the labor market. The signal si is assumed to be publicly observable and can
take two values: either sG or sB. sG (sB) is a good (bad) signal in the following sense:
given a type, the probability of being successful in the labor market is higher when 
si = sG than when si = sB. In other words, the posterior probabilities are such that:
When there is complete information on workers’ types, we define the relative
improvement in the precision of the signal sG, denoted by x(q), as follows:
P U P UH G H Bs q s q q q q, , for all in ,( ) ≥ ( ) { }.
m
m m q m m q m m m= ( ) = ( ) = − ≥, , ∆ 0.
q
qqq
U U Um H Lq m q m q( ) ≡ ( ) + − ( )( )1 .
qq
q
q
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where x(q) belongs to [0, 1]. We assume for simplicity that the technology of informa-
tion acquisition is such that the improvement in the precision is the same regardless
of the signal and the type:
Therefore, given x, the posterior probabilities are given by:
We assume that the sis are independently distributed for all i in I and, for workers of
the same type, the sis are identically distributed. Since si is an unbiased signal of the
probability of success, Pr(si = sG |q) = m(q) and Pr(si = sB |q) = 1 − m(q). Since we have
workers of mass 1, the mass of type q workers receiving signal sG is given by n(q)m(q).
Downsizing Mechanism
When qi is worker i’s private information, according to the revelation principle, we can
restrict our attention to the set of direct revelation mechanisms without loss of 
generality. A downsizing mechanism is then defined by:
where i represents worker i’s report on his type, p the probability to retain the worker
in the public sector17 and t the monetary transfer from the government to the 
worker. Since si is publicly observable, worker i is not requested to make a report on
si. When qi is known to the government, we can just replace i with qi in the above
mechanism. In terms of the political constraint, we distinguish mandatory from 
voluntary downsizing.
Let Um(q, s) (respectively, U(q, s)) represent the utility that a worker with type q
and signal s expects to obtain by entering the labor market (by accepting the down-
sizing mechanism). We have:
For simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
( G, B, G, B), ( mG, mB, mG, mB) and ( G, B, G, B) are similarly defined.
3. Mandatory Downsizing
Complete Information Case
We consider here the case of complete information on the qis. For example, superiors
usually know their workers’ abilities. Hence, if this information can be elicited for
downsizing, complete information on the qis is a good approximation of reality.
UUUUUUUUtttt
p p p p p p p pG G B B G G B B= ( ) = ( ) = ( ) = ( )q s q s q s q s, , , , , , , .
U P U U P U U
U t p p U
m H H L L
m
q s q s q s
q s q s q s q q s q s
, , , ;
, , , , ,
( ) ≡ ( ) + ( )
( ) ≡ ( ) − ( ) + − ( )( ) ( )1 .
qˆ
qˆ
p ti i i iˆ ˆ ,q s q s, , ,( ) ( ){ }
P U P UH G L Bs q x x m q s q x x m q, ; ,( ) = + −( ) ( ) ( ) = + −( ) − ( )( )1 1 1 .
x
s q m q
m q
s q m q
m q
q q q≡ ( ) − ( )
− ( )
( ) − − ( )( )
− − ( )( ) { }
P U P UH G L B,
=
,
for all in ,
1
1
1 1
.
x q
s q m q
m q
( ) ≡ ( ) − ( )
− ( )
P UH G,
,
1
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The acquisition of labor market information on m(q) and s allows the government
to discriminate workers at the participation stage. Under mandatory downsizing, in
order to induce worker i’s participation, it is enough to guarantee him a utility level
larger than Um(qi, si) and therefore the participation constraints are written as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The government maximizes social welfare given below subject to the participation
constraints (1) to (4).
(5)
In what follows, we analyze how an incremental increase in the precision of the signal
affects the optimal order and size of downsizing and social welfare.
Order of downsizing To retain a worker in the public sector, the government must
compensate him for his production cost in the public sector and his opportunity cost
associated with foregone employment in the private sector. Define the full marginal
cost MCf(q, s) as the sum of the two costs: MCf(q, s) ≡ q + Um(q, s). Then, the social
marginal cost of keeping a worker in the public sector is defined as
(6)
where the superscript c indicates complete information. The optimal number of
workers to retain in the public sector is determined by equalizing the marginal social
value of public production to the marginal social cost of keeping a worker. Obviously,
it is optimal to lay off first the workers with the highest full marginal cost.
Let ∆MCf(s) denote the difference between the full cost of an inefficient worker
having signal s and that of an efficient worker having the same signal. Given s, an
inefficient worker has a larger production cost and a smaller opportunity cost than 
an efficient worker. Since, under Assumption 2, the difference between the two types’
production costs is larger than the difference between their opportunity costs, ∆MCf(s)
is always positive. Furthermore it turns out that, under our assumptions, ∆MCf(s) does
not depend on s:
(7)
Given signal s, as the precision of the signal (x) increases, the difference between the
two types’ opportunity costs decreases, implying that ∆MCf increases with x.
Since the opportunity cost of a worker having the good signal (the bad signal)
increases (decreases) as the precision of the signal increases, an efficient worker having
the good signal can have a larger full cost than an inefficient worker having the bad
signal. More precisely, under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists x* in (0, 1) such that18
∆ ∆ ∆MC MC MC U Uf f f H L≡ ( ) − ( ) = − −( ) −( ) >q s q s q x m, , 1 0.
SMC MCc fq s l q s, ,( ) ≡ +( ) ( )1
S p p p p
t t t t
U U U U
G B G B
G B G B
G B G B
n m m n m m
l n m m n m m
a n m m n m m
+ −( )( ) + −( ) + −( )  
− +( ) + −( )( ) + −( ) + −( )( )[ ]
+ + −( )( ) + −( ) + −( )(
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 )[ ].
PC U t p p U UB
B B B B mB mB: .q s q,( ) ≡ − + −( ) ≥1
PC U t p p U UG
G G G G mG mG:q s q, ,( ) ≡ − + −( ) ≥1
PC U t p p U UB
B B B B mB mB
: q s q, ,( ) ≡ − + −( ) ≥1
PC U t p p U UG
G G G G mG mG: q s q, ,( ) ≡ − + −( ) ≥1
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(8)
In the next proposition, we summarize the results on the optimal order of 
downsizing:
Proposition 1. (order of downsizing) When downsizing is mandatory, under Assump-
tions 1 and 2 and under complete information about each worker’s efficiency in the
public sector, the optimal order of downsizing changes as the precision increases as
follows:
(a) Regime I (when x ≤ x*): ( , s G), ( , sB), ( , sG) and ( , sB);
(b) Regime II (when x > x*): ( , sG), ( , sG), ( , sB), and ( , sB).
When the precision is zero, the signal does not affect the full cost and an inefficient
worker has a larger full cost than an efficient worker. By continuity, for low precision
(i.e., in Regime I), the order is first determined by the type and then by the signal as
in Figure 1. For precision higher than x* (i.e., in Regime II), an efficient worker with
the good signal has a larger full cost than an inefficient worker with the bad signal and
therefore the order is first determined by the signal and then by the type as in Figure
1. In this case, the government prefers to let go efficient workers with the good signal
before inefficient workers with the bad signal.
Size of downsizing We now examine how changes in parameters affect the size of
downsizing. An increase in the shadow cost of public funds (l) increases the social
marginal cost of retaining a worker and therefore increases the size of downsizing. The
degree to which the government internalizes the workers’ utilities (a) does not affect
the size of downsizing since workers obtain no information rent (i.e., U(q, s) =
Um(q, s)) under complete information about the qis. An increase in the precision of
the signal (x) can either increase or decrease the size of downsizing depending on
whether the marginal worker has a good or bad signal. For instance, if the number of
the workers to retain in the public sector is determined by equalizing the marginal
qqqq
qqqq
MC MCf B f Gq s q s x x, , for *( ) ( )  .
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10 Precision, ξ*ξ
),( GcSMC σθ
),( GcSMC σθ
),( BcSMC σθ
),( BcSMC σθ
Social 
marginal
cost, SMC
Figure 1. Social Marginal Cost of Retaining a Worker under Complete Information
value of public production to SMCc( , sB) (SMCc( , sG)) the size of downsizing
decreases (increases) with x since the opportunity cost of a worker having the bad
(good) signal decreases (increases) with x.
Value of information We now examine how an incremental increase in the precision
of the signal affects social welfare. The next proposition states that, from Blackwell’s
theorem,19 an increase in the precision has a positive social value.
Proposition 2. (value of information) Under complete information about each worker’s
efficiency in the public sector and under mandatory downsizing, social welfare is
increasing in the precision of the signal (x).
Proof. See Appendix. 
We note that Proposition 2 is valid even if Assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. To
understand why the society gains from an increase in the precision, we consider the
case in which the size of downsizing is fixed (hence, the quantity of public production
is fixed) and find:
(9)
which is positive since we have p(q, s B) ≥ p(q, sG). Intuitively, an increase in the pre-
cision affects social welfare through two channels: workers’ reservation utilities and
transfers. Concerning the first, after an increase in the precision, the reservation utili-
ties of the workers having the good signal increases while those of the workers having
the bad signal decreases such that their net effect is zero. Concerning the second, the
transfer to each worker is equal to his full marginal cost multiplied by his probability
of being retained in the public sector. After an increase in the precision, the compen-
sation to the workers having the good signal increases while the one to the workers
having the bad signal decreases. Since p(q, sB) ≥ p(q, sG) holds for each type, there
will be a net decrease in the total monetary transfer, which increases social welfare.
Asymmetric Information Case
In this section, we extend the analysis to the case with asymmetric information on the
workers’ production cost qis in the public sector. For the downsizing mechanism to
induce truth-telling, it must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
We recall that the signal is public information.
The government maximizes social welfare (5) subject to the participation con-
straints, (1) to (4), and the incentive compatibility constraints, (10) to (13). The formal
characterization of the optimal downsizing mechanism is presented in Appendix. We
IC t p p U t p p UB B B B
mB B B B mB: .q s q q,( ) − + −( ) ≥ − + −( )1 1
IC t p p U t p p UG G G G
mG G G G mG:q s q q, ,( ) − + −( ) ≥ − + −( )1 1
IC t p p U t p p UB B B B
mB B B B mB:q s q q, ,( ) − + −( ) ≥ − + −( )1 1
IC t p p U t p p UG G G G
mG G G G mG:q s q q, ,( ) − + −( ) ≥ − + −( )1 1
dW
d
p p U UB G H L
x
l q s q s n q m q m q
q q
q
= +( ) ( ) − ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) − ( )( ) −( )
=
∑1 1, , ,
qq
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analyze below how an incremental increase in the precision of the signal affects the
optimal order and size of downsizing, and social welfare.
Order of downsizing Since as usual the participation constraint is binding for the 
inefficient type, the transfer that an inefficient worker receives is equal to his full cost
multiplied by his probability of being retained in the public sector (see (3) and (4)).
Then, an efficient worker having signal s can obtain a utility level equal to p( , s) ×
∆MCf + Um( , s) by pretending to be inefficient. Therefore, in order to induce truth-
telling, the government should make his utility larger than his reservation utility by an
amount p( , s)∆MCf:
Since the information rent, defined by U( , s) − Um( , s), is increasing in the 
probability of retaining an inefficient worker (p( , s)), the social marginal cost of
retaining an inefficient worker is larger under asymmetric information than under com-
plete information. Therefore, the social marginal cost of retaining a worker is given by:
(14)
(15)
(16)
where the superscript a represents asymmetric information. We note that the social
marginal cost of retaining an efficient worker is the same regardless of whether or not
the qis are known. However, we have
This fact together with SMCa( , sG) = SMCc( , sG) implies that there exists a 
threshold x** (>x*) such that SMCa( , sB) is larger than SMCa( , sG) if and only if x
is smaller x**.20
We summarize our findings on the optimal order of downsizing in the next 
proposition:
Proposition 3. (order of downsizing) When downsizing is mandatory, under Assump-
tions 1 and 2 and under asymmetric information on each worker’s efficiency in the
public sector, the optimal order of downsizing changes as follows as the precision
increases:
(a) Regime I (when x ≤ x**): ( , s G), ( , sB), ( , sG) and ( , sB);
(b) Regime II (when x > x**): ( , sG), ( , sG), ( , sB), and ( , sB), where x** > x* 
and regime II exists only if holds.
Since asymmetric information increases the social marginal cost of retaining an inef-
ficient worker, it becomes less likely that the government lets go the efficient workers
with the good signal before the inefficient workers with the bad signal. Therefore,
asymmetric information expands Regime I.
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Size of downsizing Asymmetric information increases the size of downsizing when it
is not optimal to lay off all the inefficient workers since it increases the social marginal
cost of retaining an inefficient worker. This distortion from asymmetric information
increases with l and decreases with a: this is because giving information rents to
workers becomes more costly as l increases or as a decreases. As the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry ∆MCf increases with x, an increase in the precision of the signal
may increase the size of downsizing by increasing the social marginal cost of retaining
an inefficient worker.
However, asymmetric information does not affect the size of downsizing when it is
optimal to lay off all the inefficient workers: then, the government can achieve the com-
plete information outcome since efficient workers obtain no information rent.
Value of information We now study how an increase in the precision of the signal
affects social welfare. We distinguish two cases: m( ) = m( ) and m( ) > m( ).
First, when m( ) = m( ) holds, we can still apply Blackwell’s theorem. Hence, an
increase in the precision has a positive social value.
Proposition 4. (value of information) Under mandatory downsizing and under asym-
metric information on each worker’s efficiency in the public sector, if m( ) = m( )
holds, social welfare is increasing in the precision of the signal.
Proof. See Appendix. 
However, in the case of m( ) > m( ), we cannot apply Blackwell’s theorem since the
information rent becomes a function of both the precision x and the signal s: see
Appendix for the detailed explanation. Since finding sufficient conditions for the value
of information to be positive is beyond the scope of this paper,21 we below illustrate a
case where an increase in the precision decreases social welfare.
The transfer under asymmetric information is equal to the one under complete infor-
mation plus the rent of asymmetric information. Given a level of public production,
we have seen in Proposition 2 that an increase in x always increases social welfare if
the government does not pay any rent. However, an increase in x increases the rent
since it reduces the difference in both types’ opportunity costs and thereby increases
the difference in their full costs. For instance, let us exogenously fix the size of down-
sizing such that 1 − (1 − n) (1 − G) = q. Then, we have
The first term in {⋅} represents the impact through the change in the transfer 
under complete information and the second term in {⋅} represents the impact through
the change in rent. Therefore, dW/dx is negative when downsizing is mild enough 
(1 − G small enough). We note that when there is massive downsizing such that 
all the inefficient workers are laid off, the government can achieve the complete 
information outcome and therefore, from Proposition 2, social welfare increases in the
precision.
We summarize the results in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. (value of information) Suppose m( ) > m( ). Under mandatory down-
sizing and asymmetric information on each worker’s efficiency in the public sector:
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(a) The social value of an increase in the precision of the signal may be positive or 
negative;
(b) Given a targeted size of downsizing,
(i) When downsizing is mild, social welfare decreases in the precision,
(ii) When downsizing is massive, social welfare increases in the precision.
4. Voluntary Downsizing
In this section, we briefly consider the case of voluntary downsizing. Under voluntary
downsizing, by refusing a downsizing offer, a worker of type q can stay in the public
sector with his current status and therefore obtain the status quo utility Up(q).22 We
introduce the following assumption regarding Up(q):
Assumption 3. Up(q) ≥ Um(q, s) for all (q, s).
Assumption 3 means that the status quo utility in the public sector is higher than
workers’ outside opportunity whatever his labor market information such that no
worker has the incentive to leave the public sector without compensation. Usually
Up(q) is expected to be relatively high in developing countries since public sector wages
tend to be higher than labor earnings outside of it and public sector jobs provide non-
wage benefits such as health coverage and old-age pension which are not usually
carried by the jobs available in the private sector (Rama, 1999).23
Consider first the case in which there is complete information on the qis. Under 
voluntary downsizing, the participation constraints are given as follows:
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
Since the social marginal cost of retaining a worker under voluntary downsizing is
equal to the one under mandatory downsizing, the optimal order and size of downsiz-
ing is not affected by the nature of the political constraint (i.e., whether downsizing is
mandatory or voluntary). Still, under complete information on the qis, social welfare
increases in the precision regardless of the nature of the political constraint.
We now study the case of asymmetric information on the qis. Then, the 
government maximizes social welfare (5) subject to the participation constraints,
(17) to (20), and the incentive compatibility constraints, (10) to (13).24 As was explained 
in Section 2, when there is asymmetric information, an efficient worker obtains an
information rent under the status quo before downsizing: Up ( ) − Up( ) = ∆q. There-
fore, in order to lay off an efficient worker, the government has to compensate for his
information rent and this in turn creates an incentive for an inefficient worker to
pretend to be efficient. This increases the social marginal cost of laying off an efficient
worker.
To provide an intuition, consider the case in which the government induces all effi-
cient workers having signal s to leave.Then, the government must give to each of them
a transfer at least equal to s = Up( ) − Um( , s): otherwise, they will prefer staying in
the public sector. Given this transfer, by pretending to be efficient, an inefficient worker
qqt
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with signal s can obtain an expected utility s + Um( , s) = ∆MCf + Up( ) > Up( ).
Therefore, in order to induce truth-telling of the inefficient worker, the government
should make his utility larger than Up( ) by an amount ∆MCf. This argument holds as
long as the probability of retaining efficient workers is smaller than one: then, by pre-
tending to be efficient, an inefficient worker can obtain an information rent equal to
(1 − p( , s))∆MCf. The fact that this rent is decreasing in the probability of retaining
an efficient worker (p( , s)) induces the government to retain more efficient workers
under asymmetric information than under complete information: in other words, the
social marginal cost of retaining an efficient worker is smaller under asymmetric 
information than under complete information. We note that the cost of retaining an
inefficient worker is not affected by asymmetric information.
Finally, as under mandatory downsizing, an increase in the precision (x) of the signal
increases social welfare for m( ) = m( ) while, for m( ) > m( ), an increase in the pre-
cision may increase or decrease social welfare. When m( ) > m( ), social welfare may
decrease in the precision, since an increase in the precision increases the difference in
both types’ full costs and therefore increases the information rents of inefficient
workers. In particular, when downsizing is massive such that most of the workers are
laid off, social welfare is likely to decrease in the precision since then the information
rents are large.
5. Extension: When Assumption 2 Does not Hold
We briefly discuss here the case when Assumption 2 does not hold (i.e., ∆m > ∆q/
(UH − UL)). The inequality means that in the absence of the signals sis, the difference
between the two types’ production costs is smaller than the difference between their
opportunity costs. This case happens when public sector workers’ human capital is
general enough (∆m large) and the private sector is well developed and is discrimi-
nating workers strongly enough according to their efficiency (UH − UL large). In this
case, for x = 0, an inefficient worker’s full marginal cost is smaller than that of an 
efficient worker since + UH + (1 − )UL > + UH + (1 − )UL is equivalent to 
∆m > ∆q/(UH − UL). In contrast, for x = 1, given a signal, both types have the same
opportunity cost and therefore an inefficient worker’s full marginal cost is larger than
that of an efficient worker. As a consequence, there exists a threshold in (0, 1) such
that given a signal, an inefficient worker’s full cost is smaller than that of an efficient
worker having the same signal if and only if x < holds.
We can show that all the main results (except the one on the value of information)
in the previous sections hold, regardless of whether Assumption 2 holds or not. First,
under complete information on types, the optimal structure of downsizing is deter-
mined by the full cost of retaining a worker regardless of the nature of the political
constraint. Second, when there is asymmetric information on types, workers can obtain
information rents and this affects the social marginal cost of retaining a worker. To be
more precise, we define the high-cost type (the low-cost type) as the type who has
higher (lower) full cost between the two types. Then, under mandatory downsizing, a
low-cost type can obtain an information rent by pretending to have high-cost and this
raises the social marginal cost of retaining high-cost workers while, under voluntary
downsizing, a high-cost type can obtain an information rent and this reduces the social
marginal cost of retaining low-cost workers. Last, an increase in the precision of the
signal can increase or decrease social welfare when there is asymmetric information
on types. However, when the inefficient type is the low-cost type (i.e. Assumption 2
xˆ
xˆ
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does not hold and x < ), social welfare unambiguously increases with the precision
since then an increase in the precision reduces the information rent by reducing the
difference in both types’ full costs.
6. Policy Implications
Which Type of Workers Should be Separated?
Downsizing mechanisms determine which types of workers will be matched with the
private sector. Our analysis shows that in a socially optimal matching the workers
having the largest full cost are laid off first, where the full cost of retaining a worker
in the public sector is defined by the sum of his production cost in the public sector
and his opportunity cost in the private sector. Since an efficient worker has a smaller
production cost, but a larger opportunity cost than an inefficient worker, efficient
workers should be retained in the public sector only if the difference in both types’
opportunity costs is not large (i.e., when Assumption 2 holds). This will be the case if
public sector workers’ human capital is firm-specific rather than general. In transition
economies, if the private sector is small and poorly performing, laying off first 
inefficient workers will be optimal since most of the separated workers will remain
unemployed and therefore their opportunity costs will be small. In contrast, if the
private sector is well developed and discriminates workers with respect to efficiency
more than the public sector does, laying off first efficient workers will be optimal.
Interaction between Information and Political Constraints
Under complete information about each worker’s efficiency, the political constraint
does not affect the optimal structure of downsizing since the social marginal cost of
retaining a worker is always equal to (1 + l) times the full cost whatever the political
constraint. Under asymmetric information, the political constraint determines which
types of workers obtain information rents and therefore affects the structure of 
downsizing. Consider the case when an efficient worker has a smaller full cost than an
inefficient worker. Under mandatory downsizing, as long as inefficient workers are
retained with a positive probability, efficient workers obtain information rents since
inefficient workers have a higher production cost. This increases the social marginal
cost of retaining an inefficient worker. In contrast, under voluntary downsizing, as long
as efficient workers are laid off with a positive probability, inefficient workers obtain
information rents since efficient workers have a higher status quo utility level. This
decreases the social marginal cost of retaining an efficient worker. As a consequence,
asymmetric information can only increase the size of downsizing under mandatory
downsizing while it can only reduce the size under voluntary downsizing.
Gradualism versus Big-bang Strategy in Transition Economies
Transition economies differ in terms of the speed and sequencing of different reforms.
One can distinguish countries where reforms were introduced gradually from coun-
tries where they were adopted by a big-bang strategy (Roland, 2000). Although we
took a static partial-equilibrium approach, our analysis offers some insights about the
choice between gradualism and big-bang. First, it suggests that a big-bang strategy
inducing massive layoffs may be very costly when both the information and the politi-
cal constraint are tight since the need to compensate for high status quo utility may
xˆ
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induce even the inefficient workers to obtain information rents. Therefore, it would be
desirable to find ways to induce political forces to accept mandatory downsizing. For
instance, stronger social safety nets (such as unemployment benefits) can be used as a
compensation for accepting mandatory downsizing.25
Second, our analysis shows that the degree of private sector development affects
both the structure and the cost of downsizing. If the difference between the two types’
opportunity costs increases with private sector development, it is optimal to start laying
off inefficient workers (efficient workers) when the private sector is poorly (well)
developed. Private sector development affects the cost of downsizing through two
channels: opportunity costs and information rents. The more the private sector is 
developed, the higher are workers’ opportunity costs and therefore the smaller are the
transfers needed to induce voluntary separation. Therefore, it is optimal to sequence
reforms such that reforms to expand the private sector precede downsizing.26 To
analyze the impact through information rents, consider the case in which it is optimal
to start laying off inefficient workers.Then, a further development of the private sector
will reduce the difference between the two types’ full costs by increasing the differ-
ence in their opportunity costs. Therefore, in this case, private sector development has
an additional benefit of reducing those rents.
Labor Market Information Acquisition and Downsizing
The social value of additional labor market information is always positive if there is
no informational constraint: i.e., an increase in the precision of the information about
workers’ outside opportunities always increases social welfare. However, under asym-
metric information on individual efficiency, an increase in the precision affects the
information rents by reducing the difference in the two types’ opportunity costs and
may either increase or decrease social welfare depending on which type has a larger
full cost. For example, if an efficient worker has a smaller full cost than an inefficient
worker, a reduction in the difference between their opportunity costs increases infor-
mation rents by increasing the difference between their full costs so that the value of
information may be negative.
Other Applications
Our model can be applied to other situations where the government wants to intro-
duce a new policy when agents are obtaining rents from the current policy: for instance,
it can be applied to changes in European common agricultural policies,27 reforms of
protective trade policies or inducing agents to accept the installation of (local) public
bads such as nuclear power plants, waste incinerators, prisons, etc. In these situations,
the government faces an informational constraint (each agent has private information
about parameters determining his rent under the status quo) and a political constraint
(the government needs to induce a majority of the agents to accept the new policy).
Furthermore, agents might face uncertainty about their payoffs under the new policy
and the government can acquire information about factors affecting them.
7. Conclusion
We have studied the optimal downsizing mechanism under different informational and
political constraints. The main insights from our analysis are as follows. First, the 
allocation of labor from the public to the private sector should be based on the full
(marginal) cost of retaining a worker in the public sector, which is the sum of his 
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production cost in the public sector and his opportunity cost in the private sector. Infor-
mation acquisition about workers’ opportunity costs allows the government to have
more accurate information about workers’ full costs and thereby affects the structure
of downsizing. As long as there is complete information on workers’ production costs
in the public sector, the optimal structure and size of downsizing does not depend on
whether downsizing is mandatory or voluntary since the nature of the political con-
straint does not affect the full costs.
Second, when there is asymmetric information on workers’ production costs in the
public sector, workers can obtain information rents and this affects the social marginal
cost of retaining a worker. In particular, the nature of the political constraint 
determines which type of workers obtain information rents and thereby affects the
structure and size of downsizing.
Last, the value for the government (the principal) of additional information about
workers’ opportunity costs may be negative since his objective function is directly
affected by additional information through its effect on the information rents.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We can apply Blackwell’s theorem at the level of each worker. To apply the theorem,
we have to show that (i) the government’s optimization program is well defined and
(ii) an increase in the precision improves the information structure in Blackwell’s
sense.
(i) Given a worker with type q and signal s, the only uncertainty concerning him is
whether or not he will be successful in the labor market. Let w denote the state of
nature in terms of job market performance, with w ∈ {H, L}.
The government’s program at the level of a worker is given by:
subject to
where we use (p, t) instead of (p(q, s), t(q, s)) to save space and q represents the 
quantity produced in the public sector by all the other workers. Since the transfer
is determined by the binding participation constraint, the government has only to
choose the probability to retain the worker in the public sector (p) to maximize
social welfare. Therefore, the government’s program is well defined as follows:
(ii) The information structure with precision x is finer in Blackwell’s sense than the
information structure with precision x − ∆x, with x > ∆x > 0. To show this, let F1
(respectively, F 2) denote the matrix of conditional probabilities when precision is
x (respectively, x − ∆x):
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We have
Then, there exists a matrix B such that F 2 = BF 1, where B is given by:
where bij ≥ 0 and b1j + b2j = 1 for all i and j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of the Characterization of the Optimal Mandatory Downsizing Mechanism
under Asymmetric Information
The government’s program is to maximize social welfare (5) subject to (1) to (4) and
(10) to (13). This program is quite standard and we solve it in two stages: we guess the
binding constraints, maximize social welfare subject to these constraints and then check
ex post that the derived solution satisfies all the neglected constraints.
The binding constraints are as follows. Given a signal, the participation constraint is
binding for the inefficient type (PC: , s) and the incentive compatibility constraint 
is binding for the efficient type (IC: , s). Given p(q, s), from these constraints, we can
derive the transfers as follows:
After inserting the transfers into the objective (5), from the first order derivative with
respect to p(q, s), we find the social marginal cost of retaining a worker as in (14) to
(16). The optimal quantity to produce q* is determined by equalizing the marginal
surplus from public production to the social marginal cost of retaining a worker. Then,
all the workers whose social marginal cost is lower than that of the marginal workers
will be retained and the probability of retaining the marginal workers will be chosen
so that the total mass of the retained workers is equal to the optimal quantity q*.
Finally, it is easy to check that the optimal mechanism characterized above satisfies
all the neglected constraints.
Proof of Proposition 4
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can apply Blackwell’s theorem at the level of each
worker. Since we proved in the proof that an increase in the precision improves the
information structure in Blackwell’s sense, we only need to show that the government’s
optimization program is well defined.
Given a worker with signal s, the government is facing two kinds of uncertainties
about him: his type q and his performance in the labor market w, with w ∈{H, L}. The
government has four instruments: s, s, s, s. Since the two transfers are determined
by the binding inefficient type’s participation constraint and efficient type’s incentive
compatibility constraint, the government can only choose s, s to maximize social
welfare. After expressing the transfers as functions of the probabilities and injecting
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them into the objective, we find that the government’s program can be decomposed
into two independent subprograms, the one for the efficient type and the one for the
inefficient type, as follows:
Hence, the government’s optimization program is well defined.
Why Blackwell’s Theorem Cannot be Applied When m( ) > m( )
When m( ) > m( ), the objective in the government’s optimization program with
respect to s is given as follows:
If m( ) = m( ) (i.e., ∆m = 0), the objective depends neither on x nor on s and we can
apply the theorem. However, if m( ) > m( ), since both x and s enter directly into the
objective, we cannot apply the theorem. This is a general point about adverse 
selection models. An increase of information in Blackwell’s sense does not lead 
necessarily to an increase of the decision maker’s objective function, because in addi-
tion to the usual effect on beliefs it impacts directly the objective function through its
effect on the information rent which is a function of the hazard rate.
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Notes
1. For instance, Haltiwagner and Singh (1999) study 41 public sector downsizing programs across
37 developing or transition countries. Public sector downsizing is an important issue in devel-
oped countries as well. For instance, according to a study of the civil service employment in
seven OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, Spain, Sweden, US, and UK), during the
period of 1988–97, the civil service employment decreased by more than 12% in each of them
except for France; it decreased by more than 40% in Sweden and, in US, Congress passed in
1994 legislation calling for a 12% cut in the total number of Federal civil service employees by
1999 (OECD, 1999).
2. Haltiwagner and Singh (1999) find that 20% among 41 downsizing programs experienced sig-
nificant rehiring and Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) find that nearly 35% among 400 firms
did rehiring.
3. For instance, according to Roland (2000), political constraints to enterprise restructuring can
easily be predicted in transition economies since the labor market was initially a seller’s market
and social services were concentrated inside enterprises.
4. For instance, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) classified downsizing programs into two 
categories (compulsory and voluntary) and find that 41.5% of their samples used the volun-
tary approach.
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5. See Alderman, Canagarajah, and Younger (1996),Assaad (1999), Rama and MacIsaac (1999).
Ruppert (1999), and Tansel (1998). For a brief survey, see Rama (1997). The papers typically
attempt to capture how the losses are related to workers’ observable characteristics such as wage
in the public sector, education, seniority, marital status, sex etc.
6. For instance, in the downsizing of the Central Bank in Ecuador, Rama and MacIsaac (1999)
found that the group with the lower efficiency in the public sector could have a 40 percentage
higher welfare loss from separation than the group with the higher efficiency.
7. But they assume perfect correlation of the two productivities.
8. Sequencing or speed of reforms in transition economies has been usually studied from a
dynamic general-equilibrium perspective: see Roland (2000, in particular chapters 2 and 3) for
a survey.
9. qi can be interpreted as worker i’s disutility of effort.
10. Of course, it would be desirable to take the opportunity of downsizing to implement a reform
of incentives in the public sector. However, this is rarely done and indeed it is often the politi-
cal infeasibility of such a reform that leads to downsizing.
11. The superscript p indicates the public sector.
12. It is strictly positive since distortionary taxation inflicts a cost of (1 + l) units of account to
taxpayers in order to levy 1 unit of account for the government.
13. The government may not fully internalize their utilities (i.e., a < 1), for instance, when it finds
that the workers have been already favored by generous wages and non-wage benefits in the
public sector.
14. In this case, workers in the public sector receive the same wage and non-wage benefits
regardless of their efficiency.
15. The superscript m represents market.
16. Our analysis can be easily extended to a more general case in which we have Um(q) ≡
m(q)UH(q) + (1 − m(q))UL(q).
17. Alternatively, p can be viewed as the share of part time in the public sector.
18. x* is determined by ∆q ≡ [∆m + x*(1 − ∆m)] (UH − UL).
19. For the statement of the theorem, see Laffont (1989, p. 64).
20. From (6) and (7), x** is given by
21. Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 123–4) consider information acquisition about the agent’s type
and find a sufficient condition under which a finer information structure results in an increase
in the slope of the optimal incentive scheme.
22. Up(q) was introduced in Section 2: it is determined by the incentive scheme in place in the
public sector, whose reform we do not envision.
23. Rama (1999) also mentions that effort levels tend to be lower in the public sector than
outside of it while job security is higher. The fact that queuing for public sector jobs is quite
general in developing countries also implies that public sector workers obtain utilities higher
than their opportunity costs in the private sector (Assaad, 1999).
24. The proof characterizing the optimal mechanism under asymmetric information and 
under voluntary downsizing is omitted since it is similar to the one for mandatory downsizing
in Appendix.
25. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) study how unemployment benefits affect the optimal speed
of separating state employees in a dynamic macroeconomic model without political constraint.
26. Actually, enterprise restructuring tends to happen at later stages of transition in most coun-
tries (Roland, 2000, p17).
27. Our model can also be adapted to analyze the program for eliminating price supports for
farmers (Lewis and Feenstra, 1989).
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